H. Grant Johnson and Helen Johnson, His Wife v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District : Respondent\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1968
H. Grant Johnson and Helen Johnson, His Wife v.
Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District :
Respondent's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Worsley, Snow, & Christensen; Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Johnson v. Salt Lake Co., No. 11077 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3346
1:N THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. GRANT JOHNSON and HELEN 
JOHNSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs am.d Appellants, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE COUNTY COTTON-
WOOD SANITARY DISTRICT 
DefenilamJ and Re~. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
11077 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court 
In and for Salt Lake Comity, Utah. 
The Honorable D. Frank Wilkin$, Judge 
DWIGHT L. KIN&-
WORSLEY, SNOW;& 
CHRISTENSEN 
Seventh Floor, Contin~ Bank 
Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah . 
Attorlieys for Defe'llilawt-a 
Responde.,, ~ 
:j 
,, 
•-':' -~ 
.. .1 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Atto,.,...jot/ Plaintiffs awl 
.Appti#;Idlf§ 
.. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE _________________ __________________________ __ ____________ 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ---------------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL __________________ ----------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS _________ _ ---------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------- 2 
POINT l. 
SEWER DISTRICTS ARE GOVERNMENTAL EN-
TITIES PERFORMING A GOVERNMENTAL 
FUNCTION AND ARE ENTITLED TO GOVERN-
MENT AL IMMUNITY FOR ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE... 2 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE 
A SEPARATE CLAIM IN CONTRACT.--··-----·--·-----·····-·-·- 8 
CONCLUSION --·--------------------------------·---------------------------·---·········-~-- 12 
CASES CITED 
Beck v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., (La., 1954) 72 So. 2d 765 ·······-···· 6 
Bingham v. Board of Education, 118 Utah 582, 
223 P.2d 432 (1950) -----·--------·-------··------·---··-----------------···-·--···-8 
Campbell v. Pack, 15 U. 2d 161, 389 P. 2d 464 (1964) -····-··-·-·--·· 8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Cobia v. Roy City, 12 U. 2d 375, 366 P. 2d 986 (1961) ________________ 3 
Fawbush v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan 
Sewer District, (Ky., 1951) 240 S.W. 2d 622 ____________________ 6 
Gnau v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan 
Sewer District, (Ky., 1961) 346 S.W. 2d 754 ______________________ 6 
Lindsay v. Woodward, 5 U. 2d 183, 299 P. 2d 619 (1956) 9 
Nestman v. South Davis County Water Improvement 
District, 16 U. 2d 198, 398 P. 2d 203 (1965) ___________ _ 4 
Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 
(Mo., 1964) 337 S.W. 2d 348 __ _____ ________ _________ ___________________ 6 
Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Lipscombe (Tex. Civ. App., 
1957) 308 s.w. 2d 584 ---- ----------- - - - - - -------------------------------- 6 
Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden, 112 Utah 436, 188 P. 2d 
995 ( 1948) ------ -------------------- ------- ---------------- ------------------------------- 12 
Trimming v. Howard, 52 Ida. 412, 16 P. 2d 661 _ ---------------------- 10 
STATUTES CITED 
Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) 53-4-8 __________ - -------------- --- ------- - -
TEXT CITED 
18 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (196~ Ed.).'. 
111-122 Sec. 53.05 (Immunity of Quas1-Mumc1pal 
Corporations) ___ - -
2 
8 
7 
1,N THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
If. GRANT JOHNSON and HELEN I 
.JOHNSON, his 'vife, 
Plaintiffs aind Appellants, 
SAl/11 LAKE c~\JNTY. COTTON- ) 
·wooD SANITARY DISTRICT 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11077 
This is an action for property damage sustained by 
the plaintiff when sewage backed up defendant's lines 
into plaintiffs' basement. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
RPspondent seeks affirmance of the lower court. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs are homeowners in Cottonwood, an unin-
corporated area of Salt Lake County. To provide resi-
dents of this fast-growing arPa with essential sanitary 
service on a community basis instead of allowing an obvi-
ously unhealthful proliferation of individual septic tanks, 
8alt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District was 
organized according to thP statutory dPsign set forth 
in rritle 17, Chapt0r G, Utah Code Annotated. On March 
15, 19GG, plaintiffs' basenwnt was flooded "\Yith se>wagP 
hael~ing from defendant's line-s. 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint alleging negligence 
and stating as a conclusion without pleading supporting 
facts "said event constitutes a breach of the contract 
between plaintiff and defendant" (R-1, 3). Defendant 
moved to dismiss before answer and the motion was heard 
at pretrial and again before trial. 
ARGU:l\fENT 
POINT I 
SEWER DISTRICTS ARE GOVERNMENT AL ENTITIES 
PERFORMING A GOVERNl\IENT AL FUNCTION AND ARE 
ENTITLED TO GOVERNl\IENTAL IMMUNITY FOR ACTS 
OF NEGLIGENCE. 
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Assuming for purposes of this appeal that defendant 
was negligent which negligence caused the damage to 
plaintiffs' home, as a governmental agency performing 
a necessary municipal function it is not liable for acts 
of simple negligence. As this Court recently decided in 
ColJia v. Roy City, 12 U. 2<l 375, 366 P.2d 986 (1961): 
Our concern is whether an incorporated city 
is liable for damage resulting from a sewer stop-
page on a theory of (1) negligence or (2) nuisance, 
in an isolated ease, where the question pointed 
up is whether operation of a sewer is govern-
mental or provrietary. endf'r the facts of this 
case, and because of what we have said bt'fore, we 
think the result is the same whether it is urged 
on negligence or nuisance grounds. We express 
no opinion as to a situation where the condition 
is oine resulting in continuing damage. 
Utah constantly has adhered to the principle 
of governmental immunity where the sovereign 
has been attacked on account of injury to prop-
erty, which principlr has been applied to state 
activity or that of its agencies, such .as school 
f;oards, cities, counties, the highway department, 
and thr like. 
It is recognized that there is but one Utah 
case having to do with sewers, which was decided 
before statehood (1892) (Kiesel v. Ogden City, 8 
Ptah 237, :30 P. 758) \Yhich determined that the 
operation of a sewer was actionable against the 
city if neglig1'nc1' was shown to exist. So far as 
th~t casP is inconsistent with what is said here, it 
is revenwd, particularly since that case predated 
onr state sovereignty, our Constitution and subse-
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quent legislation that gave new breadth and im-
munity to state agencies, except where specifie-
ally waived. 
It seems to us that the operation of a sewer 
more nearly is governmentally charged tha:n arc 
most or all of those situations we have reviewed . ' 
as reflected in the cases Just nientioned. To e.r-
cliide the operntion of sewers from, this field rea-
sonably woitld seem un_justifiable in logic or 
otherwisr. To do so would do violence to our 
concept of s(•paration of powers, we believe. WP 
have left to the Constitution and legislature tlw 
matter of waivt->r of immunity in such cast's. (Em-
phasis add Pd.) 
The Court, continuing, reaffirmed its definition of a 
governmental function as relating to the nature of the 
activity: "It must be something done or furnished for 
the public good." The supplemental tests are: " (a.) 
whether there is special pecuniary benefit or profit to the 
city and (b) whether the activity is of such a nature as to 
be in rei,.al rompetition with free enterprise." 
From the Cobia holding, it is apparent that, were 
defendant a municipality, plaintiffs' claim in negligence 
would be barred. But plaintiffs assert that this Court 
has refused to t~xtend the doctrine to special improvement 
districts, relying upon N estman v. South Davis County 
Water Improvement District, 16 U. 2d 198, 398 P. 2d 
203 ( 19fiil). 'J1hat case, howevPr, involved a function 
which has always been lwld to he proprietary in nature 
in this statP-orwrating a water system. 
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The Court in N estman expressly made this distinc-
tion saying: 
Quite apart from the fact just noted above, 
that the defendant ·water District is of somewhat 
different character than the governmental entities 
to which sovereign immunity has been applied, 
there is a more important and controlling reason 
\\'hy the District is not "'ntitled to that protection. 
\Vlwre a public body, which would otherwise be 
entitlPd to sov(:'reign immunity, Pngages in an ae-
tivity of a tommereial or proprietary charactPr, 
the prot(-letion doPs not (-'Xist. Specifically, we 
have held that wh<•n a city carries on th"' business 
of operating a water system and supplying watPr 
for fees, it is a proprietary function, amd the city 
is liable for damage or injury caused by its negli-
gence in connection therewith; and that the same 
is true of irrigation companies. Inasmuch as this 
activity is a proprietary one when carried on by 
a city, it could not very well be deemed otherwise 
when carried on by the defendant Water District. 
* * * 
It would indeed be anomolous and unjust if 
the inhabitants of an area could operate such a 
project under sovereign immunity by forming a 
district, \\"hereas, if the same area, or a compar-
able one, incorporated as a city, and carried on. the 
same 1activity. it would b"' without such protection. 
(Emphasis add(:'d.) 
rrhe prPS(:'nt case is the reverse of this com. If it 
wonld h"' anomalous and unjust to give an improvement 
<listrict an immunity not enjoyed by municipalities per-
forminir the same function, it vrnuld bP equally anomalous ,..., 
and unjust to deny a district immunity for performing 
a function protected when performed by a municipality. 
Other jurisdictions where sewage disposal is con-
sidered a governmental function have made no distinction 
between sewage disposal provided by municipal corpora-
tions and that provided by improvement districts. Page 
v. Metropolitan St. Louis Srwer District, (Mo., 1964) 
337 S.W. 2d 348; Faidntsh v. Louisville and J efferso11 
County Afrtropolitan Se1cer District, (Ky., 1951) 240 
8.W. 2d 622; Sinclair Pipe L?.ne Co. v. Dipscomb ( Tt>x. 
Civ. App., 1957) :-ms ~. W. 2d 58+; Beck v. Boh Bros. 
Co1ist. Co., (La., 195-l:) 72 So. 2d 7G5; Gnau v. Louisi;illc 
and Jefferson Cownty Metropolitan Sewer District, (Ky., 
1961) 346 s.w. 2d 754. 
In the Gnau case, supra, the trial court dismissed the 
action, holding that it had no jurisdiction over the de-
fendant because of governmental immunity. The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court affirmed saying: 
The sewer district is an independent public 
corporation, autonomous and self-sustaining, and 
... is performing a governmental function in the 
preservation and promotion of public health. vVP 
rer.ognized (in Fmrlmsh) that the SP'Ner District 
is an agency of the ~~tate and thus cloaked with im-
munity from liability for injury occasioned by 
negligPnt ads of its servants. 
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Leiading writers in the field uphold this reasoning. 
As stated in 18 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (1963 
Ed.), 111-122 Sec. 53.05 (Immunity of Quasi-Municipal 
Corporations) : 
It is pertinent to here state that there is a 
distinction between municipal corporations proper 
and quasi-municipal corporations concerning lia-
hility for torts, and that the general rule is that 
the latter are not liable for torts unless so pro-
vided by statutPs. 
rrhe immunity from liability of quasi-public 
corporations is generally placed upon the ground 
of their involuntary and public character. They 
are usually treated as public or state agencies, 
and their duties are ordinarily wholly govern-
mental. They exercise the greater part of their 
functions as agencies of the state merely, and are 
created for purposes of public policy. 
Under exceptional circumstances, however, at 
least in some states, counties, towns and similar 
organizations, have been held liable for torts. 
Thus, liability has been imposed where the tort 
was connected with an undertaking conducted in 
part at least for profit, or which was in the nature 
of a propriPtary activity. 
Although the authorities are by no means uni-
form, the rule of immunity above referred to, has 
hePn applied to a wide variety of governmental 
and political organizations, including drainage 
districts, flood control districts, utility districts, 
improvenwnt districts, ... and of eourse, counties. 
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Appellants assert there was a waiver of immunity 
by use of the words "sue and be sued" in the enabling 
statute. (Brief p. 4). These words do not imply a waiver 
of immunity. Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dis-
trict, sitpra. In Bi1ngham v. Boa.rd of Education, 118 
Utah 582, 223 P.2d 4:32 (1950) this Court was asked to 
construct 1a similarly wordPd statute rPading: 
The hoard of education of <:>very school ch;-
trict shall be a bod-"- eorporate ... may sue and 
be sued, and may take, hold, lease, sell and coffVl')' 
real and pPrsonal property as the interests of the 
schools may require. Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
53-4-8. (Emphasis added.) 
In that case the board of education was held immune 
from suit for negligence. See also Campbell v. Pack, 13 
U.2d 161, 389 P.2d 464 ( 1964). School districts, although 
not municipal corporations, an~ among the govPrnrnent 
agencies and bodiP.s which hav{• lwretofore hepn accorded 
immunity. Then• are many similarities hetwec•n school 
boards and special irnprovt-ment di::-;tricts in their statu-
tory authorty, organization, financing and administration. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFFS' COl\fPLAINT DID NOT STATE A 
SEPARATE CLAIM IN CONTRACT. 
Plaintiffs' hrie>f indicat<-'H a rPlianeP upon a eonfra('t 
to support rec·owry. (BriPf, p. :2). Contrnn- to nppel-
lants' assertion, it has not been stipulated that a contract 
between plaintiffs and defendant exists. From the word-
ing of the Pretrial Order, it is clear the Court and counsel 
understood that a ruling that defendant is entitled to 
sovereign immunity would be dispositive of the case. 
Although defendant does not assert that it would be 
immune for breach of contract, the trial court properly 
Jisregarded the characterization of this claim as a breach 
of contrac,t in an attempt to circumvent the doctrine of 
governmental immunity. 
l>laintiffs alleged in their Complaint: 
Defendant permitted the sewage out of its 
gathering lines ... which said event ... would not 
occur if the defendant operated its sewer coll~ 
tion . . . in a reasonably careful and ordinary 
manner, and said event constitutes a breach of the 
contract between plaintiff and defendant to collect 
and carry away from their home sewage ... (R. 2). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The essential nature of the action is a tort. Had defend-
ant refused to pay a bill for pipe a different case would 
he presented. Here the alleged breach was of a duty 
imposed by law, not contract. 
The pleading in this case is similar to that in Lindsay 
1'. Woodu:ard, 5 lT. 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619 (1956), which 
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involved a counterclaim in malpractice. Breach of an im-
plied agreement arising out of the relationship was al-
leged to circumvent the shorter tort statute of limitations. 
Applying Idaho law, this court found against the patient, 
relying upon Triniming v. Hou1arrl, 52 Ida. 412, 16 P. 2<l 
661. In the Trimming case a physician allegedly brokP 
and negligently failed to remove a hypodermic nPedlP 
which had been inserted into plaintiff':-; spinal column 
during trPatrnPnt for spinal rnpningiti:-;. 1.'he Complaint 
stated: 
The defendant was guilty of gross negligence 
and carelessnPss and failed to exercise ordinary 
care and common prudence ... and in violation 
of the contractital duty ... to skillfully ,and care-
fully treat the plaintiff and remove said needle 
from his back and in breach of the duty by reason 
of the defendant's profession and the contractual 
relationship ... in that the said deft~ndant has 
grossly, negligently and carelessly left in plain-
tiff's hack a portion of said broken needle approxi-
mately three-fourths of an ineh in length. 
The Idaho Ruprt>me Court stat(•d: 
1.'his ea:-;e is prPsented to th<• court upon two 
thPories, a1ipellant eontending tliat it i:-; one on 
contract, colort>d with recently discovered fraud 
and concealment, tolling thP statutes of limita-
tion, and l'PSpondent is insistpntl:-- cont0ncling tkit 
it is a casP of malpraetisP, sonncling in tort, and 
tlwn•fore harn•d hy C. N. ~~Pdion (iG12, suhd. -L 
Tlw complaint primarily nllf'!-',"<'S that a contract 
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f ?r treatment was entered into between the par-
b es. So far so good. But, in the performance of 
that contract, respondent impliedly contracted 
that he would exercise ordinary and reasonable 
care, the which is 'another way of saying that such 
duty is imposed by law. 
* * * 
Wt' do not ltave to deal here with a contract 
·whereby the surgeon expressly undertook to use 
extraordinary skill and care. Tha,t being out of 
the u:ay, the charging parts of the complaint will 
determine tchether or not the grffvamen of this 
action consists of a. ln-e(lrh of the contract, itself, 
or the dirty impnsed hy lnw in relation to thP man-
ner of its peformance. Aside from the one allega-
tion of fraud and concealment, the basic allega-
tions of the complaint a.re directed solely to care-
lessness, negligence, and misconduct as the pr.oxi-
mate caiise of the injiiry claimed to have been 
suffered. Respondent is not arraigned for breach 
of contract, but for delinquencies incidental to 
its performance. As alleged, these are the very 
foundation of the action, and, if true, constituted 
nothing lmt malpractise. The gist of a malpractise 
action is nPgligence, not a breach of the contract 
of employment. ThP origina,z injury, be it caused 
by carelessness, negligence, misconditet, or what-
not, remains the sole cause of a.ction; and the 
action is one ·in tort a1nd not for a breach of con-
tract. The appropriate statute of limitations is 
determined by the substance, not the form, of the 
action. \Ve hold, th1:.•rt>fore, that the instant case 
based upon a cause of action sounding in tort is 
plainly a ;-;nit for malprartise. (Emphasis added.) 
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Ree also, T,wylor Bros. Co. v. Duden,, 112 1Ttiah 436, 188 
P.2d 995 (1948). In Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. LiP'scomb, 
supra, the court disregarded the pleading of an unconsti-
tutional taking by noting the nature of the claim asserted 
waR negligffi'llce. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant is a governmental agency performing 
a governmental function with the support of itR statu-
tory taxing power. That function does not become pro-
prietary \vhen performed by other than a city any more 
than this claim becomes one for breach of contract by 
ealling it so. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
\\TORSLEY, 8NOW, & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Sc>venth Floor, Continental Bank 
Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Responde11 t 
